The first presentation of the Seminar by Igor Lys covered the general question of why it is important to remind ourselves why governments are different from businesses,
and the essential role the global context of uncertainty plays in defining strategies and decisions on all levels.

Progress (successfully achieving a tangible goal with measurable results) is a better indicator of efficiency
than abstract ‘innovation,’ which means advancing far on a chosen road. Quoting C.K. Lewis, «sometimes, progress means doing an about-turn and walking back to the right road; in that case, the man who turns back soonest is the most progressive.»

Context matters — governments have special responsibility, and can not ‘wait and see’ contrary to most businesses. In the current context of great uncertainty the price of a eventual bad policy choice or badly delivered public service is multiplied.

In a system where uncertainty on higher levels (international, national, regional...) is weak, an eventual mistake can be corrected by a higher level equilibrium. But in the modern context, where uncertainty is high, such balancing act is unlikely. Recent crises like the onle proviked by Liz Truss’ ‘mini-budget’ confirm that. In such condtions, governments must learn from each other and invest more time and resources into identifying better options.

The second presentation, delivered by the co-founder of Quartz Venture Capital fund, and co-founder of DataSeries publications, Maxim Matias, was focused on the
most prominent megatrends in technology and explored how corporate ‘strategy maps’ can inspire governments.

In technology, one can measure progress by looking at who spends the most on R&D and by looking at ‘strategy maps’ — schemes that illustrate in which domains and
which companies big international players invest, with whom they set up partnerships, and whom they
acquire. Governments should not just understand the key megatrends but also think about their own strategy
maps.

Today, essential R&D investments in absolute numbers from the public side come from the United States, followed by China and, with a significant gap, Europe. In % of
GDP, global leaders are Israel (4.9% compared to 3,45% in the US and 2,3% European average) and South Korea (4,8%). On the private side, Amazon is the biggest R&D spender with ~$20B annual spending, comparable with the state of Israel ($23B).

The primary sectors are ICT, electronics, software, pharma, and automotive. Strategic issues are far behind, with alternative energy sources representing less than 1% of
global R&D spending, and food and beverages slightly over 1%.
Looking at the companies’ strategy maps, we see that they have very far-reaching projectons, with for example Apple acquiring and partnering up with health companies to become a global health player, Amazon signing partnerships with a dozen connected vehicle tech companies, and Carrefour exploring metaverse.
Governments must think about their own strategy maps and be aware of the most important global tech trends: digital future of work and life, shift to at-scale autonomous operations and services, exposure of more and more data to cyber attacks, focus on critical problems such as climate and longevity, etc.

The best way for governments to tackle these challenges is through talent, but it is one of the biggest challenges for them. How to become competitive, attractive, and retain talent?

The third presentation was delivered by Manlio Graziano, professor of geopolitics at SciencesPo and La Sorbonne, president of the Spykman Center for international geopolitical studies. His presentation was a one-hour dive into the main geopolitical trends of the modern era.

To build sustainable, durable solutions, we must understand the current international context and the world we live in. To produce this ‘big picture,’ geopolitical studies move from general, big-scale, to local cases. The key issues revolve around very long-term (longue durée de Braudel), long-term, mid-term, and immediate trends and tendencies. The presentation explored the current world from these standpoints.

The primary overall trend is the shift of power from the West, specifically the Unted States, towards other centers of influence. The U.S. is thus weakened, and in the meantime, China has to confront the possible failure of ‘Deng’s gamble’ — a bet on the well-proven identity between enrichment and consensus — implying that authorities must ensure enrichment to maintain consensus. Europe is a ‘ghost actor’ of international relations, being nothing but a mere sum of 27 different national interests. It has to become aware of its ‘fault lines’, specificaly its foreign policy (and policies towards China in particular), the migration issue, and internal division within the member states (e.g., sovereignists vs. confederalists).

Japan has still ranked the third global power in terms of GDP, but it has never truly recovered from the Plaza agreements and has an old and aging population.

India and Turkey believe they can enter the club of the great powers without being supported by dynamic economic growth. Their ruling class may recognize that their economic momentum has dissipated. Instead, they use diplomatic (India’s ‘multialignment’ policy) and diplomatic-military (Turkey’s ubiquity in the Middle East, Caucasus, Northern Africa and Somalia, besides, of course, in its Black Sea backyard) means, which look more like Russia-style cunning-tricks than solid geopolitical prospects. Again, their growing authoritarianism could become another big obstacle.

We are living in a long transition from the old global order (the ‘Yalta order’) to the next one. This transition phase is necessarily characterized by increasing global disorder. So-called deglobalization will exacerbate this disorder because it aggravates the global economic crisis and multiplies social discontent, possible troubles, and nationalisms.